The Internet and its Effect on the Presidential Primary System
Quarter in
In the past decade, the Internet has restructured the way American citizens can interact with their government. In the case of the Presidential Primary System, experts have characterized “the Internet as fast becoming a Virtual New Hampshire: a quirky but pivotal place where campaigns are launched or scuttled.” [2] The emergence of direct democratic influences like the Internet, however, has only given party activists greater ability to promote their extremist ideologies through greater grassroots mobilization. As Internet usage has developed in the
Hypothesis
Party outsiders have been successful at wrestling control of presidential party nominations from party insiders before. For instance, Jimmy Carter’s rise to the Democratic nomination in 1976 has gone down in history as an outsider who was able to circumvent party insiders to win a momentum driven nomination. After Carter, there are few instances of candidates who were able to gain their party’s nomination without important party leader endorsements. John Zaller, in his book Beating Reform, recognizes this new form of party insider control of nominations that developed since Carter’s nomination by stating that despite not having direct control of nominations, the endorsement derby serves as the “principal institutional mechanism, or coordination game by which party leaders can choose their party’s nominee.” [4]
The Internet appears to be undermining party insider control. Instead of gaining prominence through party endorsements, the Internet has allowed activists to coordinate their actions through improved Information and Communication Technologies (ICT’s)[5] without traditional party support. Party activists having the ability to pull their party toward more ideological extremes is nothing new, and political scientists like John Zaller have shown that this can be attributed to less activity by a disengaged general ‘middle of the road’ electorate. Closer examination reveals that tools that empower the general electorate, like the Internet, only benefits those most active in politics already, or activists during this transitory period where a majority of American voters are still disengaged from politics. I hypothesize that increased usage of the Internet by political activists in politics overwhelmingly serves to tilt future nominations in favor of extreme candidates that polarize electoral politics.
Since the Carter fiasco, party leaders have attempted to endorse and have mostly succeeded in nominating candidates that not only appeal to party activists but also have a reasonable chance of winning in the general election. While party outsiders have not been successful in gaining nomination of a Democratic candidate since Jimmy Carter, Howard Dean’s run for the Democratic primary reveals major change taking place under the radar of traditional party insiders from the pre-Internet era. Howard Dean’s chances at nomination may have fallen apart due to lack of party insider support and a political ‘gaffe,’ but it is important to note that although Dean was a party outsider, he was also Democratic frontrunner for some time. Future presidential primaries are bound to be influenced in this way by coordinated activist groups that can organize and mobilize effectively through the Internet.
Theory
The method of organization and communication permitted through the Internet dramatically changes the primary process. This may be due to the primary’s traditional, vertically structured make-up with party leaders at the top, activists in the middle, and rank and file voters at the bottom, being misaligned by the Internet’s ascendance. Contrary to this interpretation of traditional roles of players in the primary system, the Internet emphasizes a horizontal, or networked model of communication and interaction which encourages citizens to become more involved. Joe Trippi, Dean’s campaign manager, even quotes Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone by stating the Internet’s bottom up formation helps create civic engagement. While Trippi sees the Internet as the salvation for reigniting true discussion of issues, he fails to recognize that activist organizations are essentially the only groups using the Internet effectively at this point.
The Internet has allowed certain players in media politics to become more empowered. For example, the Internet allows activists to engage ‘rank and file’ voters through relatively cheap, bottom up, and interactive communication rather than the disengagement of voters seen by the expensive, bland, and top-down structure of political communication through television.[6] Democratic activists’ ability to mobilize support of their candidate (Howard Dean) almost entirely through the Internet changes the traditionally understood process of primary politics. John Zaller notes that “Howard Dean’s successful use of the Internet to attain initial ascendancy will stand as a model for future insurgents.” [7]
John Zaller has put forth the following research model for analyzing the primary system dynamic:
Party Leader Endorsements --> Activists --> Nomination
Zaller believes endorsements matter most because donors want to place their bets on winners. Endorsements provide a way for political donors to evaluate potential winning candidates. While actual poll ratings also affect endorsements, Zaller notes “the effect of endorsements on polls is somewhat stronger.” [8] My research model gives a greater role to activists utilizing the Internet to provide increased funding and poll ratings to certain maverick candidates that political leaders can then use to evaluate their eventual endorsements. The new model I am proposing debunks Zaller’s theory that party leader endorsements are currently the most important variable in determining future nominations.
Mobilization and Organization of Activists through (ICT) -->
Party Leader Endorsements --> Nomination
The mobilization and organization of activists through the Internet allows for outsider candidates to get a rise in polls, and thereby influence future endorsements.
The infusion of campaign donations via the Internet has changed the traditional role of donors in the primary process. Zaller is keen on establishing that campaign donors have an incentive to coordinate behind a United Front candidate so they have a better chance of winning the general election, but even Zaller cautions donors are not “deterred from [uniting behind a candidate with] a factional base, since most fund-raisers have no base.”[9] Activists that are now better mobilized and organized through the Internet can create this ‘factional base’ that donors can rally behind, as happened for Howard Dean in 2004.
Activists (ICT) -->Small Campaign Donations --> Rise in Polls (Media Buzz) -->
Donations collected via the Internet can create a media buzz, in turn leading to further donations.
Some theorists have argued the primary system already favors factional candidates. For example, Nelson Polsby has argued the post McGovern Frasier primary system “is systematically rigged to favor factional candidates.” [10] I, however, believe John Zaller is correct in his assessment that party insiders have manager to control every nomination from 1980-2000 through party leader endorsements. [11] Not until the Democratic Primary of 2004 did we see a factional candidate break this dynamic and demonstrate a counterweight to insider influence in primary politics through party leader endorsements.
The changing structure of media in the last ten years has influenced the way activist organizations mobilize to draw grassroots support towards their candidate. For example, campaign fundraising for the Dean campaign occurred primarily through the Internet, eliminating the need for large mailer, telephone and door-to-door labor intensive operations. While John Zaller notes that party leader endorsements matter more, he also warns, “the heavy flow of Internet money into the Dean campaign has greatly affected the dynamics of the 2004 campaign. Whether political insiders will learn to contain the disruptive effect of this outsider money in 2004 as well as in future elections looms as a major unanswered question at this point in our analysis.” [12] A new analysis of primary politics is needed to understand how prior to his defeat Dean managed to raise over 50 million dollars, more money at that point in the primary process than any other Democratic presidential nominee in history. Whether party insiders will learn eventually to utilize a less controlled form of media like the Internet to their own advantage for influencing primaries remains open to speculation.
Traditionally, candidates have tended to rely on a small pool of donors for financial support during their campaign. Zaller has stated that these small donors have an incentive to bet money on the winner. The progressive revelation of party leader endorsements via the ‘endorsement derby’ was formally given credit for helping to coordinate the donation decision of donors. The Internet, however, has permitted candidates to bypass this small pool of donors and access a larger pool of donors, albeit providing smaller amounts of money. Dean raising much of his money through the Internet from smaller donations brings up a fundamental question: Will candidates rely on the traditional small pool of donors in the future or, instead, will they choose to go after a larger pool of donors, even though they risk receiving smaller donation amounts? It is a classic problem of quality of donors able to provide larger donations, versus quantity of donors able to provide smaller, but many donations. The choice candidates make for forming a base of support can dramatically affect the primary process in ways that include: creating more volatile campaigns, polarizing a party by delivering an incoherent message to the media and rank and file voters, and costing a party votes during a general election. Howard Dean may not have won the Democratic Primary but his candidacy forced John Kerry to take a stance on the controversial
Current research by prominent scholars in media politics regarding the Internet’s affect on primary politics is still in its infancy. Since the Internet has only recently been seen influencing politics dramatically, using a comparative model of media politics to evaluate the Internet’s role is necessary. John Zaller’s, A Theory of Media Politics, is a good starting place for this comparative research. Zaller believes that the media only serves to reinforce party leader control, thereby making the media a friend instead of a foe of party insiders. Other theorists like Thomas Patterson argue that the media’s role is a miscast one where negativity in the media results in American citizens being turned off by politics in general. Joe Trippi finds this negativity as being the direct reason for disengagement of average voters from politics, and the reason the Internet is needed to provide renewed dialogue of issues. Media negativity by a comparative medium such as television has the potential to allow hyper activity by activists through the Internet to promote extreme candidates. My theory will explore how this debate has certain implications for the Internet’s future role in primary politics.
Methodology
Analyzing different cross sections of the invisible primary period for all candidates from both the 2000 Republican Primary and the 2004 Democratic Primary allows me to show how extreme candidates are more empowered with the new way grassroots organization and mobilization occurs through the Internet. Zaller’s model of the endorsement derby is clearly demonstrated in the nomination of George W. Bush for the Republican Primary of 2000. In 2000, a clear insider favorite candidate emerged from the beginning—George W. Bush. An outsider candidate (Arizona Republican Senator McCain) did attempt to challenge Bush, but could not gain any momentum. Zaller correctly attributes Bush’s assured win in the 2000 primary over McCain to “Republican insiders actively and overwhelmingly supporting George W. Bush.” [13] No clear endorsement derby winner appeared during the Democratic Invisible Primary of 2004, yet Dean managed to raise millions of dollars and remain ahead of the pack for much of the Invisible Primary.
Looking at polling data from the Republican Primary of 2000 and the Democratic Primary of 2004, as well as Internet donations associated respectively with each of the primaries, would allow me to correlate greater Internet donations with better performance in polling. The correlation would show how activists use the Internet to support more extreme candidates. This type of study encounters some problems, including the difficulty in deciphering which is the causal variable and gaining access to the data. Currently, the Federal Election Commission only requires information about who gave money to whom, when the money was given, and how much was given. The FEC does not require candidates to keep record of how money was collected and this leads to serious data limitations for my research in terms of proving that Internet funds can be responsible for the influx of smaller donations to “Dean for
Viewing the Dean phenomenon using a quantitative analysis is not the only way I hope to answer how activists benefit from utilizing the Internet. More qualitative means can be used to measure my argument such as scouring academic papers, news articles and journals for first hand accounts of whether the Democratic establishment ever embraced Dean, or he was an outsider until the end. Also, forecasting how Dean's example is affecting the plans of the '08 candidates is a more relevant goal of my research.
Activist Mobilization and Organization via the Internet (ICT)
With many new technologies, embrace by mainstream society usually occurs after acceptance into the business world. Arizona Political Science Professor Matthew Hindman notes, “thousands of businesses have quietly used the Internet to streamline organizational logistics.” [15] The Internet has been most effective in improving the business to business end, or ‘back-end’ of business activity. This seems to be the case with the Internet’s prevalence in political campaigns by “revamping back-end campaign functions like fundraising and volunteer recruitment—critical tasks that did not involve mass appeals to voters” [16] The Internet’s integrative role provides improved communication and transference of information within political campaigns.
The greater form of communication and transference of information provided to a political campaign via the Internet does not necessarily translate into party insiders more easily coordinating on a candidate more likely to win in a general election. The Democratic Primary of 2004 showed the Internet’s ability to create power imbalances within the traditionally understood primary process. Despite higher poll ratings for Dean, no clear winner emerged from the endorsement derby.[17] Nonetheless, Dean’s progressively rising stand in the polls signified another force that helped Dean advance in the polls.
There is evidence to suggest that new people have been brought into the political process through the Internet, thereby undermining the argument that it has only fixed fissures within the party itself. The following study presented last fall to the American Political Science Association describes these new quasi-activists being brought into the realm of political party activism:
Those whose involvement began through Meetup differ from those who were already involved in the campaign before attending Meetups. They are younger, less active politically, and have weaker Democratic party affiliation.[18]
Despite this new form of activism being milder than the traditional activism, it suggests just how much easier the Internet allows activism to ascend in importance to the presidential primary process.
The Internet has made party insiders much more conscious and reactive to the thoughts and feelings of all factions in their party, particularly extremist. After all, extremist factions of a party supporting a maverick candidate have the ability to blunt a party’s success in the general election and the success of the Howard Dean campaign in 2004 showed this new dynamic at work. No clear winner was apparent after the endorsement derby, presumably because of the pronounced voice of extremist factions within the Democratic Party mobilizing and organizing through the Internet, thus undermining the traditional basis for evaluating candidates. Matthew Hindman notes that if it were not for the Internet “Dean would not have won major endorsements, as he did from previous candidates Al Gore and Bill Bradley, from a parade of congressmen and elected officials, and from key unions initially expected to support opponents like Richard Gephardt” [19]
A Case Study: The Republican Primary of 2000
Endorsements helped catapult George W. Bush to the Republican nomination in the 2000 Primary. The 2000 Republican Primary is a good example because it shows the maverick John McCain making a gain in terms of poll ratings but still not winning in the end because of Bush’s overwhelming support from political insiders. Zaller notes “McCain was widely considered by members of his party to be a maverick rather than a team player” because of his alignment with populist issues such as campaign finance reform. In Zaller’s view, McCain never had a chance against Bush who had gained important party leader endorsements during the Invisible Primary.
McCain’s poll ratings reveal a candidate who was able to attempt a viable campaign but never achieve higher poll ratings than Bush. Up until March of 2000, McCain’s poll ratings never surpassed Bush despite wins in
McCain’s run reveals how important the role of campaign fundraising is when competing for a presidential party nomination. When McCain ran out of financial resources, his campaign run was essentially over. Bruce Bimber, author of Campaigning Online: The Internet in U.S. Elections, notes McCain’s loss in
McCain’s approach to the new Internet medium as if it were television, from a top down perspective, probably limited his success in using the new form of ICT more effectively. The New York Times reported in 2000 that McCain did schedule an online fundraiser, an event where McCain would be watched and heard on the computer, and where he would take questions from people online.[21] McCain was approaching the web as a tool where he had to be visibly present in order to make it work effectively. The first notable difference from the Howard Dean Primary run of 2004 was that Dean elected to have decentralized social networks where Dean himself would have a less commanding role in his campaign. While McCain and his campaign staffers may not have known how to capitalize on this technology, it may be that the activist community that would likely support McCain had not fully matured in terms of understanding how the Internet could be used as a medium to further its goals.
A Case Study: The Democratic Primary of 2004
No clear endorsement derby winner existed during the Democratic Invisible Primary of 2004, yet Howard Dean managed to emerge as the frontrunner in terms of poll ratings for much of the Invisible Primary. His campaign used what Williams, Weinberg, and Gordon have characterized as an “e2f (electronic to face) community technology that facilitates people with similar interests finding each other online, so that they can get together or “meet up” offline, bringing about a new type of hybrid people and technology-based phenomenon.”[22] Dean capitalized on utilizing ‘back-end’ functions to catapult his campaign and was rewarded with an influx of campaign donations, media buzz, and a boost in poll ratings. The Dean phenomenon did not rely on party leader endorsements in order to win the Invisible Primary. Instead, party insiders used Dean’s poll ratings and Internet fundraising capabilities as a means to evaluate whether they would endorse Dean.
Howard Dean was the clear poll leader going into the Iowa Primary. While my theory attributes this gain as a result of Internet empowered activists helping extreme candidates, there is evidence to suggest the effectiveness of endorsements was simply canceled out by the inability of party leaders to rally behind a particular candidate. Major endorsements did occur during the Democratic Invisible Primary of 2004, but no clear endorsement derby winner ever emerged. Zaller has noted that during the Democratic Invisible Primary of 2004 “there was essentially a four-way tie for first” in terms of party leader endorsements. [23] The inability for party insiders to coordinate provides further evidence for how Internet empowered activists were able to ruin the traditionally understood coordination game.
| Year | Governors | Senators |
| 1980D | 66% | 12% |
| 1980R | 17% | 37% |
| 1984D | 32% | 22% |
| 1988D | 15% | 5% |
| 1988R | 46% | 31% |
| 1992D | 41% | 18% |
| 1996R | 80% | 43% |
| 2000D | 65% | 49% |
| 2000R | 87% | 38% |
| 2004D | 4% | 8% |
| Source: John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 68 |
Table 1: Percent of Pre-Iowa Endorsements
The major disengagement of endorsements by governors and senators during the pre-Iowa period of the 2004 Democratic Primary provides further evidence of party leadership inability to coordinate endorsements. Table 1 shows, respectively, only 4% of Governors and 8% of Senators endorsing a Democratic candidate during the 2004 Invisible Primary, as opposed to the 50% and 28% averages seen in the previous nine invisible primaries. This provides further evidence that newly empowered activists via the Internet may have been the cause for mass indecision among party leadership. Perhaps when no clear endorsement derby winner emerges, activists then play a greater role in influencing the nomination. I still argue, however, that activist action and influence via the Internet will continue to stifle future attempts at coordination via the endorsement derby. While the Dean campaign may have been an ‘exceptional’ case in Zaller’s eyes, future outsider candidates have the potential to ruin coordination through gaining media buzz by other forms of campaign activity such as fundraising capabilities via the Internet.
Campaign Fundraising
The Howard Dean campaign proved overwhelmingly that Internet fundraising can be used effectively. Prior to the availability of a larger pool of donors via the Internet, “candidates often gravitated toward big contributions, despite the implicit quid pro quos, as they felt they had no choice. Raising small money had become prohibitively time-consuming and expensive.”[24] The Internet has allowed candidates to bypass traditional barriers to campaign finance by targeting wider amounts of donors, albeit less affluent, at a minimal expense. Emilienne
Despite no formal quantitative mechanism existing for proving more Internet donations produced higher poll ratings for Dean, there is much to be said about the type of donor Dean attracted to his campaign. Mathew Hindman notes:
Overall, 61 percent of Dean’s financial resources came from those giving $200 or less. Only 2,851 donors—less than 1 percent of the total—gave $2000, the maximum under federal law. These large givers provided 11 percent of Dean’s total funds. At the end of January [2004], those who gave the $2,000 maximum were responsible for 58 percent of Kerry’s campaign war chest, and 73 percent of Edward’s financial resources. [26]
Dean managed to gain more donations from a larger pool of ‘small’ donors. In fact, Dean raised money so effectively that he “became the first-ever Democratic presidential candidate to forgo public financing for his primary campaign and the spending limits that go with it.” [27] Dean’s ability to circumvent traditional routes of campaign fundraising has profound effects for the future of the primary system.
Gaining campaign donations via a larger pool of donors, however, does not necessarily translate into a more coherent message ideologically for a party during the general election. Mathew Hindman notes the problem with Internet donations by addressing the problem of their size. Smaller donations tend to send less precise messages to candidates than the more precise messages sent by larger contributors. [28] During the Democratic Primary of 2004, there was no clear dependant variable between online campaign fundraising and party leader endorsements. Instead, donations made online exhibited more spontaneity than larger contributions made by a small pool of donors. [29] Zaller’s theory of primary politics relies on a small pool of donors following rank and file behind party insider endorsements. The infusion of money via the Internet changes this fundamental order of events Zaller relies on.
It is important to view Internet fundraising by outsider campaigns as a strategic counter to the influence by political insiders through party leader endorsements. While Zaller recognizes money is still important, he attempts to argue that “money seems a less decisive influence in presidential nominations than many believe – and notably less decisive than political endorsements.” [30] I believe this to be wrong and proof can be seen in the way strategic decision makers chose to circumvent endorsements and concentrate on more effective means of raising money through Internet campaign donations. Joe Trippi, for example, made the strategic decision from his start as Dean’s campaign manager that he would concentrate on Internet donations. The New York Times reported in December of 2003 that “it was Mr. Trippi who calculated that it would take 2,000 nights of 1,000-person, $100-a-plate fund-raisers to match President Bush's expected $200 million purse, and thus turned to the Internet as the only possible cash-raising tool that could compete.” [31] The potential for success during the Invisible Primary lied with innovation of fundraising capabilities and future maverick candidates with little chance of running an effective campaign via campaign endorsements will continue their attempt at circumventing traditional routes to nomination.
Media Buzz / Rise in Polls
Poll leaders from the Invisible Primary heading into the formal visible primary have tended to win their parties nomination. Zaller points out that:
Only three of nine contested nominations from 1980 to 2000 were cases in which the early poll winner failed to win. In the other six cases – Reagan in 1980, Mondale in 1984, Bush in 1988, Dole in 1996, Gore in 2000, and Bush in 2000 – the early poll leader did win.[32]
Ideally, Zaller would describe early poll leaders being the result of party leader endorsements creating media buzz which in turn led to their rise in polls. Howard Dean, however, achieved this dynamic through his fundraising capabilities primarily via the Internet creating media buzz, leading to higher poll ratings, which in turn led to more media buzz. Diagram II shows how this circular dynamic of media buzz and poll ratings help fuel each other. The ability of outsider candidates to circumvent party leader endorsements as their primary goal is critical to establishing how outsider candidates can play a more pronounced role in future nomination attempts.
Maverick candidates attempting to achieve some form of ‘momentum’ for their campaign is nothing new and Zaller has shown this dynamic to happen in the past through Jimmy Carter’s ‘momentum’ driven nomination in 1976. “The pattern was to do better than expected in the
Brit Hume from on "Fox News Sunday" stating "You look at the field, you can't figure out who can beat him." Washington Times Editorial Page Editor Tony Blankley, on CNN's "Crossfire" stated "I think he's going to win, because he's too smart for them." Carl Quintanilla from "NBC Nightly News" stating Dean was "The man to beat as
It is not surprising that in the same month these quotes were taken, Dean was clearly the poll leader. The media nearly crowned Howard Dean the Democratic nominee and winner prior to any formal primaries helping to fuel the media buzz/poll rating circular dynamic I described before.
The way media covers a primary can potentially influence a primaries eventual outcome. Zaller has noted “the amount of coverage allocated to candidates in the Invisible Primary will be roughly proportional to standard indicators of political strength—because stronger candidates have greater anticipated future importance.” [35] Therefore, performing better during the Invisible Primary should allow candidates to whistle by in the Visible Primary. During the Invisible Primary, “reporters pay attention to objective indicators of likely success, notably poll standings, key victories, and fundraising prowess.”[36] While Zaller’s theory relies on party leader endorsements for these poll standings, key victories and fundraising abilities to progress, the same feats can potentially be achieved through Internet empowered activists assisting mavericks to create positive press from fundraising abilities and poll ratings, thereby whistling through the visible primary.
Party insiders have managed to stop outsiders from running effective campaigns through media momentum before. This is shown most explicitly with the example of actions taken after the Jimmy Carter campaign which concentrated all of its resources on the first couple primaries in order to gain media momentum. Zaller claims that the momentum driven nomination of Jimmy Carter was killed by political parties through frontloading, or “moving more and more of the action in the nomination process to an earlier and earlier point.” [37] Frontloading served to minimize the impact of publicity candidates got, which in turn led to less time for candidates to gain valuable fund-raising, organization, and poll ratings which could have positively influenced later contests. The ‘Dean for
While future candidates might not be reported on as much as Dean was for the innovation of allowing his campaign strategy to concentrate on raising Internet campaign funds, Dean’s ability to lead polls into the first primary will still be seen as a threat to party insiders. Viewing how party insiders attempt to stop future candidates supported by Internet empowered activists will be interesting, particularly because of the difficulty in regulating the decentralized medium. The jury is still out on how political institutions like the Federal Election Commission will attempt to put a stranglehold on the Internet’s future usage by campaigns in primary politics.
The Federal Election Commission and the Internet
Currently, the FEC is attempting to classify the Internet’s future role in the presidential primary system. There is evidence that both parties have been attempting to adjust to the Internet’s new role in campaign fundraising. Many believe the Internet will only be effective as long as it remains unregulated. There is, however, evidence to suggest party insiders are attempting to stifle future threats from Internet empowered candidates by regulating the Internet. FEC commissioner David M. Mason has stated:
We are almost certainly going to move from an environment in which the Internet was per se not regulated to where it is going to be regulated in some part. That shift has huge significance because it means that people who are conducting political activity on the Internet are suddenly going to have to worry about or at least be conscious of certain legal distinctions and lines they didn't used to have to worry about. [38]
Whether party insiders will learn to how to regulate, more or less enforce, the interactive form of mobilization and communication created through the Internet remains questionable. I would argue that the difficulty in regulating Internet functions conducted by political outsiders is precisely why the Internet shows such potential for outsiders to continue becoming empowered, thereby enabling further extreme candidates to run successful campaigns.
Other Causes for future Extremist Candidates in Primary Politics
Media Negativity and Its Influence on Extremist Candidates
Other more institutionalized factors besides the Internet can be considered for an explanation of extremist candidates being more empowered during the primary process. Some theorists, like Patterson, believe that the media’s constant framing of politics as a ‘game schema’ or strategic game has contributed to people being turned off by not only primary politics, but all politics. Therefore, during important political functions such as the invisible primary, party leaders and activists end up being most active anyways. The drop in activity by a disenchanted ‘middle of the road’ electorate during the invisible and visible primary disallows more moderate candidates from running effective campaigns during the primary process.
Future Nominations
Analyzing the field of candidates lining up for the 2008 presidential primary can reveal certain issues that may arise with activists having more influence through greater Internet organization and mobilization. The Republicans, for example, face a challenge in their next primary of finding a viable candidate that satisfies all factions of their party in order to replace George W. Bush. Evidence shows that a maverick candidate, John McCain, who ran an outsider campaign before may attempt another run at presidency. His run could potentially demonstrate the effectiveness of future outsider candidates if he should choose to run on a more populist platform again. If my theory is correct, utilizing former political strategies he has used such as Internet fundraising would greatly enhance his fundraising prowess. Additionally, if McCain manages to gain significant donations from a larger pool of donors and become poll leader, it will demonstrate how the new dynamic of outsider money has ruined the traditionally understood endorsement derby.
There is even evidence that McCain may be revamping his campaign to appear more like a centrist. The San Diego Union Tribune has alluded to the former outsider Senator promoting the image of a centrist candidate by stating:
It could be that his most recent efforts to pound out the compromise in the Senate and put off, for the time being, a political bloodbath over the filibuster might serve him well with those who are sick of the polarized atmosphere in Washington. For that crowd, the senator from
Zaller’s theory would encourage McCain’s move towards the center to give him a better chance of securing his party’s nomination by building a united front that has a better chance of winning him the nomination and general election.
Although it is still too early make any firm observations about the Democratic presidential primary of 2008, Hilary Clinton appears to be the current frontrunner for the Democratic Party. Despite Hilary’s popularity among many Democrats and Republicans within
But, Dean still didn’t win the Nomination…
While Dean did not become president or win his party’s nomination for that matter, his run does demonstrate how outsiders can become insiders. This is shown most explicitly in the Democratic Party’s nomination of Howard Dean, a former maverick candidate, as chairmen of the DNC. Analyzing what this means for the future of the Democratic Party is important because it shows how activist influence via the Internet can catapult outsiders to relative positions of major influence within their respective party, thereby influencing future nominations. Matt Bai from The New York Times recently summarized how Howard Dean has influenced the Democratic Party by stating:
Somehow, at the end of the day, Dean managed to triumph over his rivals after all. Lashing out at Washington Democrats as timid and feckless during the primaries, he vowed to ''take back our party,'' and he did exactly that. The party's Congressional leaders could talk all they wanted about how Dean would be a mere functionary -- ''I think Dean knows his job is not to set the message,'' Harry Reid lectured -- but, like Kerry's welcoming e-mail message, such statements had the ring of self-delusion. The moment the votes for chairman were counted, Howard Dean became the de facto voice of the Democratic Party. [41]
While Dean’s nomination as DNC Chairman may show how party insiders embrace future political threats by embracing outsiders, Howard Dean’s mere example as an outsider who became an insider will surely motivate future political outsiders to run. In this sense, activists empowered by the Internet did achieve their goal indirectly of promoting more extreme presidential candidates in the future.
Since Dean’s new goal as DNC Chairman is to get as many Democrats elected as possible, the type of donor Dean attracts will surely influence future Democratic candidates. The Hill recently reported that Dean is having difficulties balancing the two types of donors that arose in the 2004 Democratic Primary and evidence shows he has been trying to cater to the less affluent, large pool donor. “Democratic sources link the resignations [of three top fundraisers from the DNC] to Dean’s decision to focus on raising money in small increments through the Internet, as he did during his 2004 presidential bid, and building up the party’s grassroots infrastructure while paying little attention to major Democratic donors.” [42] If smaller donations are tied directly to activist mobilization and organization via the Internet, my theory of more extreme candidates arising in the future would benefit from Dean’s current actions.
Further analysis of the Internet’s implications for political primary system is still needed but certain conclusions can still be drawn from the Internet’s usage in the 2004 Democratic Primary. At the very least, the Internet was seen indirectly balancing the playing field between insider and outsider candidates, thereby allowing nominations during the Democratic Primary of 2004 not be decided by insiders or activists, but by the people originally intended to be the deciders – the voters. At the most, activists empowered by the Internet have successfully wrestled control from party insiders and we will incrementally start seeing more maverick candidates running viable campaigns that are taken more seriously by the media and party insiders.
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[1] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 28.
[2] Rachel K. Gibson, Electronic Democracy, p. 117.
[3] The Invisible Primary is widely considered to begin the year prior to any formal primary. It is a period where candidates rally for support of elected officials, top fund-raisers, interest group leaders, and campaign organizers in their party.
[4] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 42.
[5] ICT and the Internet mean essentially the same thing, as such, they will be used interchangeably throughout the paper.
[6] Joe Trippi, The Revolution will not be Televised, p.36
[7] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 3.
[8] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 83.
[9] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 64.
[10] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 30.
[11] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 2.
[12] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 58.
[13] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 37.
[14] John Zaller. "Re: Fwd: I am a former student of yours." E-mail to Rudolph E. Brandes. 9 May 2005.
[15] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 121.
[16] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 121.
[17] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 67.
[18] Christine Williams . "When Online and Offline Politics Meetup: An Examination of the Phenomenon, Presidential Campaign and its Citizen Activists ." American Political Science Association. ,
[19] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 126.
[20] Bruce Bimber. Campaigning Online: The Internet in
[21] Staff. "2000 Campaign Briefing." The New York Times 1 Feb. 2000: A19.
[22] Christine Williams . "When Online and Offline Politics “Meetup:” An Examination of the Phenomenon, Presidential Campaign and its Citizen Activists ." American Political Science Association. ,
[23] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 67.
[24] Carol Darr. "Internet donors can clean up national campaign financing."
[25] Emilienne
[26] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 124-125.
[27] Noelle Straub. "Dean goes his own way; Forsakes federal funds for campaign." The
[28] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 128.
[29] Matthew Hindman. "The Real Lessons of Howard Dean: Reflections on the First Digital Campaign." Perspectives March 2005: 128.
[30] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 55.
[31] Jodi Wilgoren. "Dean's Manager: Inside Savvy and Outsider Edge ." The New York Times 13 Dec 2003, Late ed.: A4, Pg 1.
[32] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 67.
[33] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 90.
[34] Howard Kurtz. "Howard Dean's Media Landslide; Pundits Call a Winner, a Bit Prematurely." The
[35] John Zaller, A Theory of Media Politics, p. 55.
[36] John Zaller, A Theory of Media Politics, p. 58.
[37] John Zaller, Beating Reform, p. 91.
[38] Brian Faler. "Considers Restricting Online Political Activities; New Rules May Apply to Web Ads, Bloggers' Endorsements." The
[39] Staff. "Looking to 08; McCain could make GOP race interesting." The San Diego Union-Tribune 31 May 2005: OPINION; Pg. B-6.
[40] John F. Harris. "Heeding the Past As She Looks To the Future."
[41] Matt Bai. "What Dean Means." The New York Times 27 February 2005, Magazine Desk ed.: Section 6, Page 21.
[42] Alexander Bolton. "Fundraisers jilt Dean." The Hill 7 June 2005.
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